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CHAPTER 11 |
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MY REPLY TO THE RESPONDENT'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT |
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I did not receive the Respondent's Summary of Argument until I realized there was such a document when I saw it listed on the Draft Index for the Application Book for Special Leave to Appeal in the High Court of Australia. The Draft was posted by the Registrar of the High Court, dated 11 November 1998, and I received it on it on 12 November. I phoned the High Court on 13 November telling of the opponent's solicitors' withholding of the document and asked that they insist that it be served. The Respondent's Summary of Argument was filed on 22 October 1998 and I finally received it in the mail on 16 November. The Registrar still kept to the deadline for my Reply which had to be filed by Wednesday 25 November. The respondent's Summary of Argument was nine pages long with twenty-two references, as can be seen in the previous chapter. There was no time to research those references and my Reply could not exceed five pages. The answers to those twenty-two references will have to put to the High Court in the form of an address, i.e.: when I have had time to get to the law library and look them up. Their argument consists solely of repeating that the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to summarily try contempt of court but nowhere is trial by jury precluded, i.e.: nowhere does anyone say one cannot have a jury trial. It is all bluster. Anyway, I filed it on Tuesday 24 November and it appears below. IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA No. S 127 of 1998 BETWEEN: JOHN WILSON APPLICANT'S REPLY PART 1 - REASONS WHY SPECIAL LEAVE SHOULD BE GRANTED Contrary to what the Respondent claims, i.e.: that I have not raised any matter justifying the grant of special leave, I have raised many matters which demand the High Court to administer not only the law but justice which is the primary function of all courts. Not to grant special leave would be compounding the injustice which has already been inflicted on me. The matters:- Granting special leave would be the first step necessary to redress and remedy the perverting of justice which has resulted from wrongful judgements brought down by a succession of judges I have encountered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the High Court of Australia who have repeatedly concealed bank fraud in the form of the variable interest rate loan affair. This is a matter of national importance because the extent of judicial perfidy and corruption, if not eradicated, is a scandal which will destroy the integrity of our system of justice. This is a matter of national importance because banks must be brought to justice and their victims, who are the ordinary people of Australia and have suffered hardship and misery involving the theft of their homes, farms, businesses with devastating effects to their families, are entitled to restitution. This is undoubtedly the most crucial case ever to be brought in Australia's history because should leave not be granted then the people of Australia will have the proof that the judiciary are the instruments of oppression and tyranny who willfully are in contempt of the due process of law and willfully take from the people their rights. If special leave is not granted the judiciary will be branded the enemy of the people. JUDICIAL PERFIDY, PERJURY AND CORRUPTION: Judges have sworn an Oath of Allegiance to "well and truly serve" Her Majesty when She has sworn to uphold "Law and Justice, in Mercy" and to accept the Holy Bible as "royal Law". Judges have sworn "to do right". However, by uttering that and adhering to the statement that "the rate itself is indeed certain", when the rate is variable or uncertain, plus having in their possession information of the serious offence of fraud while taking no action, judges have committed perfidy, perjury and corruption. This is of national importance. QUESTIONS OF LAW: Questions of law based upon the sections of the Australian Constitution and numerous State and Federal laws, their validity and application, as well as the very fundamental principles of government (eg: the will of the people) mentioned in my Applicant's Summary of Argument must be determined for "peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth" and in the interests of justice, itself. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT: The Respondent saying "In the event that the Applicant is convicted of contempt after a summary hearing, he may, should he choose to do so, raise this issue on appeal against his conviction" makes a mockery of due process because there must not be a summary hearing in the first place because it is my inalienable right to trial by jury which is the substance for my Application for Special Leave to Appeal. The High Court of Australia must not abrogate its "original jurisdiction". PART II - THE RESPONDENT'S "BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS" The fact is that I dispute the entirety of the judgement of Hidden J of March 1998. The additional matter of fact is that I am charged with contempt of court which is the interference with the administration of justice and of which I am not guilty. PART III - THE RESPONDENT'S "BRIEF STATEMENT OF ... ARGUMENT" Because the Respondent's Summary of Argument was withheld from me from the date it was filed (22 OCT 1998) until the Registrar of the High Court told the Respondent's solicitors to serve it whereupon it arrived in my letterbox on 18 NOV 1998, the limit of 5 pages for this Applicant's Reply and the deadline imposed by the Registrar of the High Court, a full and detailed reply to the argument raised by the respondent's solicitors and the citings listed is not possible. To be fair, I must be given more space and time. For example: the Respondent's paragraph 8, where he claims that "Magna Carta does not establish a right to trial by jury" and quotes McKechnie, Magna
Carta, 2nd ed., McKechnie says, on page 376, the following when describing "CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE": "1. Its Main Object. It has been usual to read it as a guarantee of trial by jury to all Englishmen; as
absolutely prohibiting arbitrary commitment; and as solemnly undertaking to dispense to all and sundry an equal justice, full, free and speedy.2 The traditional interpretation has thus made it, in the widest terms, a promise of
law and liberty and good government to every one.". This interpretation is strongly endorsed in The Statutes at Large of England and of Great-Britain, edited by Thomas Tomlins (M.DCCC.XI.), when referring to CAP.XXIX
of Magna Carta it says: And where the Respondent refers to such quotes as Toohey J in Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 66 citing Holdsworth, History of English Law, 7th edition (1956), volume 2 at pp 214-215, as being "pertinent .. that whilst it was said in the seventeenth century that c 29 (together with related chapters) embodied the principles of the writ of Habeas Corpus and of trial by jury, "It is not difficult to show that, taken literally, these interpretations are false. Trial by jury was as yet in its infancy.. " ", the actual words and the literal interpretation of that part of CAP XXIX of Magna Carta are: "nisi (unless, except, but) per (by, by means of) legale (lawful) judicium (judgement) parium (equals, peers) suorum (of his own) and William Hawkins' book, Lord Coke, Professional Books Limited, London, reprint 1982, at page 225, publishing Lord Coke's manuscript with the column note of "The beginning of juries" saying: "And albeit, that certain opinions and judgements are reported in the Norman tongue, yet those are not aptly termed the laws of England. But it is objected out of Polidore Virgil, (see Hick. Dissert. epistol. p. 152, 153.) that juries and trial by twelve men were first invented in the Conqueror's time; which undoubtedly is apparently false; and thus I prove it. The book of Dooms-day was made in Saint Edward the Confessor's time, and all the manors that were in the hands of king Edward were ancient demesnes, and all his tenants had those privileges, that those tenants in ancient demesne have at this day..... (etc).". Saint Edward the Confessor was born in 1003 and died in 1066. The argument as to when juries came into being is of historic interest but the reality is Magna Carta guaranties the right to trial by jury. Magna Carta granted that right "for evermore" and many Acts, such as Habeas Corpus reiterate that right and that guarantee. When the Respondent's solicitor says, in paragraph 10, that "The summary procedure proposed to be undertaken in this case accords with these principles" ie: that "Magna Carta c 29 embodies a "protest against arbitrary punishment, and against arbitrary infringements of personal liberty and rights of property" (Holdsworth, Volume II at p 215; Wade and Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 10th edition, Longman, London, pp 13 -14), this is absolutely false. The word arbitrary means "based on one's own wishes, notions or will; not going by the rule of law; using or abusing unlimited power; tyrannical; despotic..." and what clearer examples of arbitrary can there be than Master Greenwood's declaration which started this scandalous affair of "Thus whilst the amount of the future rate is uncertain, the rate itself is indeed certain." and then all the subsequent judgements which will be presented in my defence? When the Respondent's solicitors say, in paragraph 11, that Magna Carta "does not hold the status of a constitutional provision in NSW, rather it is open to "affectation and modification" by ordinary legislation enacted by the State Parliament (Galea ..)...", this is untrue as explained in my Summary of Argument when referring to section 80, 109, and 118 of the Australian Constitution and clause 5 of the Constitution Act 1900 and section 5 of the NSW Constitution Act 1902. Also, in paragraph 11, when the Respondent's solicitors say: "The Supreme Court Act and Rules have affected the asserted right to trial by jury in providing for a procedure whereby contempt may be prosecuted by summary procedure (see Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 53 (3F), Supreme Court Rules Part 5; Fraser v The Queen (No2)(1985) 1 NSWLR 680 at 691 - 3 per McHugh JA)., where does it say that trial by jury is precluded for contempt of court? Even if the Supreme Court Act and Rules did say that trial by jury was precluded, that would be a nullity because as it is said in The Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia by Quick and Garran, 1901 at page 791: "The Federal Parliament and State Parliaments are not sovereign bodies; they are legislatures with limited powers, and any law the attempt to pass in excess of those powers is no law at all, it is simple a nullity, entitled to no obedience." Please note that this incomplete Reply cannot be regarded as a dealing with the situation in the manner in which it must. PART IV - COSTS The Applicant seeks costs. PART V - AUTHORITIES McKenie, Magna Carta, 2nd edition, 1914 p 376 PART VI - ORAL ARGUMENT I seek to supplement my Summary of Argument, my Supplementary Summary of Argument and this Reply with oral argument. Dated the day of November, 1998 |
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Site researched and written by J. Wilson jhwilson@acay.com.au and is best viewed with a screen resolution of 600 x 800ppi
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